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Immoral conduct by real estate brokers: 
Donaldson v Department of Real Estate. 2005 
Roger Bernhardt 
 
Real estate license not subject to revocation for conviction of unlawful intercourse with 
minor nonconsent. 
Donaldson v Department of Real Estate (2005) 134 CA4th 948, 36 CR3d 577 
After Donaldson, a Department of Real Estate license , entered a no contest plea to unlawful 
intercourse with a minor (Pen C §261.5(c)), the Real Estate Commissioner filed a disciplinary 
accusation to revoke or suspend his license under Bus & P C §§490 and 10177(b), alleging that 
his conviction was a crime involving moral turpitude and substantially related to the 
qualifications, functions, or duties of a real estate licensee. At the administrative hearing, 
Donaldson admitted engaging in unlawful intercourse, but testified that he believed the victim 
had consented, although he conceded that she lacked the legal capacity to consent.  The 
Commissioner declined to adopt the administrative law judge’s proposed decision in 
Donaldson’s favor. Instead, she directed revocation of his license, finding that the victim, his 
wife’s sister, was a nonconsenting participant. Donaldson’s mandamus petition was granted on 
the ground that the weight of the evidence did not support the finding that the intercourse was 
nonconsensual. 
On remand, the Commissioner again revoked the license, omitting any finding that the victim 
had not consented in fact, but concluding that discipline was proper on the ground that, in 
criminal law, consent is not a defense to the crime of sexual intercourse with a minor. 
The court of appeal reversed. Under §10177(b), Bus & P C §490 limits the Commissioner’s 
discretion to suspend or revoke a real estate license for convictions of crimes involving moral 
turpitude to crimes “substantially related to the qualifications, functions, or duties of the business 
or profession for which the license was issued.” At the time of Donaldson’s conviction, 10 Cal 
Code Regs §2910 specified that a crime was deemed to be “substantially related” within the 
meaning of §490 if it involved “[s]exually related conduct causing physical harm or emotional 
distress to a person who is an observer or non-consenti g participant in the conduct.” 
The court rejected the Commissioner’s rationale that a minor is incapable of consenting to 
sexual relations and is therefore a “non-consenting participant” in any sexual relations he or she 
may have. The court explained that the statutory presumption of nonconsent was abandoned in 
1970, when the legislature struck the offense of sexual intercourse with a minor (commonly 
known as statutory rape) from the statutory definitio  of rape and adopted Pen C §261.5, which 
treats sexual intercourse with a minor as a crime with or without the minor’s consent. As the 
supreme court recognized, in the 1970 amendments “the Legislature implicitly acknowledged 
that, in some cases at least, a minor may be capable of giving legal consent to sexual relations.” 
People v Tobias (2001) 25 C4th 327, 334, 106 CR2d 80. Accordingly, that general principles of 
criminal law could not support the Commissioner’s ruling that the victim here was a 
“nonconsenting participant” in the sexual intercourse underlying Donaldson’s conviction. 
THE EDITOR’S TAKE: Donaldson was able to retain his license because the DRE erred in 
concluding that a 16-year-old was categorically incapable of consenting to sex, not because 
of any doubts the court had about the relationship of sex with a minor to real estate 
brokering. I might have thought that the connection between such activities was too slight to 
support revocation, given that car salesmen are ablto hold on to their licenses despite 
similar misconduct (see Brewer v DMV (1979) 93 CA3d 358, 155 CR 643), but then I read 
the case of Cannizzaro v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (P  Commw 1989) 564 A2d 564.  
In that case, John Cannizzaro, a real estate broker, accompanied by his brother Anthony, 
a real estate salesperson, and by his father Frank, went to Kenneth Manear’s office to 
complain about a judgment Kenneth was trying to colle t for unpaid commissions John 
owed him. A dispute broke out and, according to the court, “Manear took from John 
Cannizzaro the baseball bat he had brought with him, struck Frank Cannizzaro with it and 
began to choke him. Coming to his father’s aid, Antho y Cannizzaro struck Manear on the 
head with a hammer, to no avail, and ultimately shot Manear three times with the gun he 
carried for self-protection.” After the brothers were both convicted of third degree murder, 
the real estate commission revoked their real estate licenses. The revocations were upheld  
because the criminal action at issue was perpetrated upon a business associate because of 
business dealings . . . . [W]e cannot say that the penalty of revocation is patently 
unreasonable, particularly given the Commission’s explanation that its decision ultimately 
turned upon the fact that underlying felony convictions were undeniably linked to the real 
estate business itself. [Emphasis added.]  
That tells me that matters may not be as simple as they seem. Moral turpitude, in and of 
itself, may not be sufficient to lead to license revocation unless there is also some business 
purpose involved along with it. Donaldson may have be n spared because his victim was 
“merely” a family member; had she been a client or fellow agent, he might have been in real 
trouble. —Roger Bernhardt 
 
